Education as a Vital Right by Kozinski, Clayton
Journal of Legislation
Volume 43 | Issue 1 Article 2
12-4-2016
Education as a Vital Right
Clayton Kozinski
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation





EDUCATION AS A VITAL RIGHT 
Clayton Kozinski† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has long recognized the problem of discrimination against the 
disabled in accessing public services, including education. Congress first addressed 
the problem in 1973 by enacting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of disability by any federally funded program or 
activity. Congress subsequently enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), which expanded this prohibition to all state and local gov-
ernments. Both of these statutes provide for money damages and the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees by successful plaintiffs. 
With respect to the education of grade school students in particular, in 1975 
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (“EAHCA”)1 in 
response to congressional studies that revealed 
better than half of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not re-
ceiving appropriate educational services. Indeed, one out of every eight 
of these children was excluded from the public school system altogether; 
many others were simply “warehoused” in special classes or were ne-
glectfully shepherded through the system until they were old enough to 
drop out.2 
The EAHCA mandated that children with disabilities had the right to a “free 
appropriate public education,” and established administrative procedures for secur-
ing that right.3  However the EAHCA did not include money damages or attorneys’ 
fees. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the EAHCA was the exclusive 
remedy for disabled students asserting their right to access public education in 
Smith v. Robinson.4 Congress reacted by passing an amendment to the EAHCA 
overruling Smith v. Robinson to provide for attorneys’ fees and money, in addition 
to equitable remedies, stating: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, pro-
cedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal statutes. protecting the rights of 
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 1.  Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 2.  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
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handicapped children and youth, except that before the filing of a civil 
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part, 
the procedures under subsections (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the 
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this 
part.5 
In 1990, the name of the EAHCA was changed by amendment to the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), at which time an express reference to 
the ADA (which had been enacted in the interim) was added to the above quoted 
provision.6  Thus, Congress made clear that equitable remedies alone were insuffi-
cient to remedy the widespread discrimination against students with disabilities, and 
the inclusion of money damages was needed to effect meaningful change. However, 
the ability of both grade school and college level students (who are not covered by 
the IDEA) with disabilities to recover money damages from state-run educational 
institutions7 depends on whether Congress successfully abrogated sovereign im-
munity when it enacted Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. 
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, bars suits in federal court against states 
by citizens of other countries and other states.8 In 1890, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Eleventh Amendment as extending to suits in federal court brought by 
citizens against their own state.9 Sovereign immunity also extends to an entity that 
                                                            
 5.  The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). 
 6.  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1990). 
 7.  Whether an educational institution is considered an arm of the state for purpose of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity depends on a number of factors including the status of the institution under state law, 
the institution’s degree of autonomy and whether the state is ultimately liable for paying a money judgment 
obtained against the institution, and the results vary from state to state. See, e.g., Scaglione v. Mamaroneck 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 F. App’x 17, 18 (2d Cir. 2002) (New York) (finding public schools to be arms of 
the state); Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir.1992) (California); Minton v. St. 
Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1986) (Louisiana). But see Holz v. Nenana City Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 347 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (Alaska) (finding public schools are not arms of the state); Jefferson 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Bryan M., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (N.D. Ala. 2015); Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 
F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2006) (Mississippi); Creager v. Bd. of Educ. of Whitley Cnty., Ky., 914 F. Supp. 1457 
(E.D. Ky. 1996) (Kentucky); Stoddard v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Lincoln City, Wyo., 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979) 
(Wyoming). The results are similarly diverse for universities and charter schools. 
 8.  “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST., amend. XI. 
 9.   Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). However, this case did not address the circumstances under 
which Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court (with Justices Brennan and Stevens concurring) held that Congress 
had the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Enforcement Clause (Section 5) of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), in a fractured opinion au-
thored by Justice Brennan, the Court held that Congress could also abrogate sovereign immunity under the 
Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  That case was subsequently overruled by a sharply divided 
court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Souter authored a dissent joined by Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer on the ground that Eleventh Amendment immunity only applies to disputes between states 
and citizens of other states, not suits involving citizens of the same state. Justice Stevens authored a separate 
dissent making the same point, but even more strongly. Justice Stevens was so troubled by the holding in 
Seminole Tribe that in his dissent in Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000), he stated: “Despite 
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qualifies as an “arm of the State,”10 but not to local governments such as counties 
and municipalities or their agencies.11 
There are two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: a voluntary waiv-
er of sovereign immunity by the state and congressional abrogation of sovereign 
immunity with respect to a specific federal statute made applicable to the states by 
means of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Typically, the first exception applies where 
Congress conditions acceptance of federal funding on a waiver of state immunity.13 
However, Title II of the ADA has no such provision. Thus, for it be constitu-
tionally valid it must meet two conditions: Congress must have made unequivocally 
clear that it intended to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Con-
gress must have acted pursuant “to a valid grant of constitutional authority.”14 Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power “to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”15 Section I of the Fourteenth 
Amendment encompasses both due process and equal protection.16 
There is no question that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immuni-
ty when it enacted Title II because it explicitly said so in the statute.17 However, 
whether Title II meets the second requirement, at least insofar as it applies to dis-
crimination on the basis of disability in the context of public education, is another 
matter. 
Lower federal courts are divided on the issue. In some states a student with 
a disability can bring a damages claim against a public school or college for violat-
ing Title II, while in other states the same student would be out of luck.18 This is 
not a minor issue where regional differences are acceptable. Title II is a major piece 
of federal legislation that impacts one of the most important services provided by 
the government: public education. Discrepancies on such an important issue are 
troubling and must eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court. This paper will 
attempt to suggest a way courts might resolve the question in a manner consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent and will hopefully be capable of withstanding the 
Court’s inevitable review. 
III. ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BY MEANS OF PROPHYLACTIC 
LEGISLATION: THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE RATCHET THEORY 
In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,19 the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected a black woman’s equal protection challenge to the literacy test re-
quirement for voting in the State of North Carolina.20 The Court noted that although 
                                                                                                                                                 
my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.” He was joined 
in that dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. 
 10.  N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 194 (2006). 
 11.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); see also Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 54 (1978). 
 12.  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 
 13.  Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996). 
 14.  Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 n.3 (2001). 
 15.  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. 
 16.  Id. at § 1. 
 17.  42 U. S. C. § 12202 (1990). 
 18.  See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). 
 19.  360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 20.  Id. 
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Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution establishes the right of suffrage, it expressly 
makes that right “subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discrim-
inatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant 
to its constitutional powers, has imposed,” 21 subjecting restrictions on the right to 
vote to the relatively low “rational basis” standard. Because the state’s literacy test 
was neutral on its face, the Court easily concluded it was constitutional.22 
Congress subsequently enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which “was de-
signed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting.”23 The 
1965 Voting Rights Act included numerous provisions restricting certain states, 
when certain conditions are met, from placing facially neutral requirements, such as 
literacy tests, on the right to vote. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme 
Court held this provision to be constitutional based on Congress’s power to enact 
remedial and preventative, i.e. prophylactic, legislation that proscribes “facially 
constitutional conduct”24 to combat an entrenched historical pattern of racial dis-
crimination in voting that persisted despite the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on such 
discrimination.25 
That case was followed in the same term by Katzenbach v. Morgan.26  The 
Court addressed another provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, prohibiting the 
State of New York from using English literacy tests on Puerto Rican voters whose 
education was in Spanish, rather than English. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissent-
ed on the ground that there was no factual data showing a history of discrimination 
against Puerto Rican minorities in New York, and therefore the law was not reme-
dial in nature. The dissent asserted Congress was unilaterally extending constitu-
tional protection to a state whose conduct had never been found to be unconstitu-
tional. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, appears to have acknowledged as 
much in what became known as the “ratchet theory,” which suggests that Congress 
can expand constitutionally protected rights but cannot restrict or eliminate rights 
already determined to be protected by the Constitution.27 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT REPUDIATES THE RATCHET THEORY AND ESTABLISHES 
THE CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
Although not without criticism, for the next three decades Justice Brennan’s 
ratchet theory was commonly understood as good law.28 However, that interpreta-
                                                            
 21.  Id. at 51. 
 22.  The Court did note the literacy test would be unconstitutional if there was evidence it was “em-
ployed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot,” but held 
that no such inference could be made in the present case.  Id. at 53. 
 23.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). 
 24.  Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003). 
 25.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301.  Although this legislation was technically enacted 
pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power to enforce that Amend-
ment through “appropriate legislation,” the Court made clear that Congress’s authority under Section 2 is the 
same as its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
 26.  384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 27.  Id. at 651, n.10. 
 28.  See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, Katzenbach v. Morgan and Congressional Enforcement Power Un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment: A Study in Conceptual Confusion, 17 HOUS. L. REV. 69 (1979); Donald Fran-
cis Donovan, Note, Toward Limits on Congressional Enforcement Power under the Civil War Amendments, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 453 (1982). 
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tion of Morgan was squarely rejected by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.29 
The decision in Flores is part of what has been characterized as the “Rehnquist 
Revolution.” Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court 
issued a number of decisions that “dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ 
powers and [] greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity.”30 
Flores addressed the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) as applied to the states. Congress enacted RFRA in response 
to the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith, that, even though 
the free exercise of religion is expressly included in the Constitution, “neutral, gen-
erally applicable laws [that apply] to religious practices” are subject to the “rational 
basis” standard, rather than the far more stringent compelling governmental interest 
standard.31  RFRA expressly overruled Smith by mandating that the “compelling 
interest” standard must be applied to any statute that has a “substantial impact” on 
religious practices.32 
In Flores, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Smith by holding 
RFRA to be an unconstitutional extension of congressional power. The Court made 
clear it is solely the purview of the judiciary to determine what constitutes a consti-
tutional violation, and Congress can only use its Section 5 powers in a manner “re-
sponsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”33 
Acknowledging that “the line between measures that remedy or prevent uncon-
stitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the law is not 
easy to discern,”34 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, articulated the “con-
gruence and proportionality” test to aid in the analysis. Under this test, it is first 
necessary to identify the constitutional right at issue and the way this right has been 
adversely impacted by state law. Congress may then enact appropriate remedial 
measures so long as there is “a congruence between the means used and the ends to 
be achieved.”35 If the proposed remedy exceeds the scope of the identified injury, 
the legislation is an “intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives” and there-
fore an unconstitutional overreach of congressional power.36 
In Flores, the Court found that “Congress had uncovered only anecdotal evi-
dence that, standing alone, did not reveal a widespread pattern of religious discrim-
ination in this country.”37 As a result, RFRA was “so out of proportion to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”38 
Returning to Morgan, the Court noted two possible rationales that could justify 
the result without resort to the ratchet theory. One was that the provision at issue 
was intended to remedy “discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.” The 
other was “to deal with ‘discrimination in governmental services’” by “giv[ing] 
                                                            
 29.   521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 30.  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. RV. 1 (2004); see also discussion supra 
note 9. 
 31.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 32.  Religious Freedom Registration Act of 1993 (RFRA) Pub. L. N. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (et seq)). 
 33.  Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 34.  Id. at 519. 
 35.  Id. at 534. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 531. 
 38.  Id. at 532. 
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Puerto Ricans ‘enhanced political power’ that would be ‘helpful in gaining nondis-
criminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.” 
The Court found that “[b]oth rationales for upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitu-
tional discrimination by New York and Congress’s reasonable attempt to combat 
it.”39 
The Court subsequently applied the congruence and proportionality test in 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett40 and Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents41 to invalidate congressional abrogation of state sovereign im-
munity as to Title I of the ADA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), respectively. Both statutes are prophylactic legislation that targeted em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of disability and age, respectively. 
Because neither disability nor age are suspect categories for equal protection 
purposes, “the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to make special ac-
commodations” for the disabled or the elderly, “so long as their actions toward such 
individuals are rational.”42 In order to adopt a broad prophylactic statute abrogating 
state sovereign immunity and providing a damages remedy for discrimination on 
the basis of disability or employment, Congress would need to “identify . . . a 
‘widespread pattern’ of irrational reliance [by the states] on such criteria,” which 
the Court held Congress had failed to do as to either statute.43 
It is noteworthy that the majority opinion in Garrett was authored by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in which he was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and 
Thomas. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter 
and Ginsburg joined. In his dissent, Justice Breyer took the majority to task for 
“[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency rec-
ord.”44 Justice Breyer included an appendix to his dissent in which he provided a 
“complete listing of the hundreds of examples of discrimination by state and local 
governments.”45 He chided that “[t]he Court’s failure to find sufficient evidentiary 
support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict, judicially creat-
ed evidentiary standard” and concluded “it is difficult to understand why the Court, 
which applies ‘minimum ‘rational-basis’ review’ to statutes that burden persons 
with disabilities [] subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those 
same individuals.”46 
In 2003, the Court applied the congruence and proportionality test to another 
piece of prophylactic Section 5 legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (“FMLA”), in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.47 The ma-
                                                            
 39.  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641(1966). 
 40.  531 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2001).  Patricia Garrett was a nurse who had been diagnosed with breast can-
cer, which required time-consuming radiation and chemotherapy treatments.  As a result of these treatments, 
the state hospital for which Garrett worked transferred her to an inferior position that carried less authority 
and less pay. Milton Ash, a second claimant in the case, was a security officer employed by the state who was 
diagnosed with chronic asthma and sleep apnea.  He requested a reassignment to accommodate his conditions, 
which was denied. 
 41. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  Daniel Kimel sued Florida State University for failing to give him a raise on 
account of his age. 
 42.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 351. 
 43.  Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003). 
 44.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 45.  Id. at 388. 
 46.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 47.  Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721. 
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jority opinion, somewhat surprisingly authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist with Jus-
tice Kennedy dissenting, held the FMLA, which “entitles eligible employees to take 
up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of several reasons,” and pro-
vides state employees the right to money damages as a remedy, was a valid exercise 
of Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.48 
The Court emphasized that the FMLA addressed “state gender discrimination, 
which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny,” making it “easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”49 Underscoring the subjective na-
ture of the congruence and proportionality test, the majority and the dissent vigor-
ously disagreed over whether the evidence that Congress had adduced was suffi-
cient to justify the prescribed remedy.50 
The Garrett Court made clear that its decision was limited to Title I of the ADA.  
This left the lower courts to grapple with the constitutionality of Title II consistent 
with the principals established in Flores and Garrett. 
V. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AND TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Post-Garrett, Every Circuit Court to Consider the Issue, Save the Ninth, 
Held Title II Was Not a Valid Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity 
Title II of the ADA provides:  “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or denied the benefits 
of the services, programs or activities of a public entity.”51 Every circuit to consider 
the issue of whether Title II validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity with 
respect to equal protection claims post-Garrett held that it did not, with the Ninth as 
the only outlier.52 
                                                            
 48.  Id. at 724. 
 49.  Id. at 722. 
 50.  Id. at 735, n.11. 
 51.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990). 
 52.  See Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that Garrett “effectively 
overruled” prior circuit precedent holding that Title II validly abrogated sovereign immunity); Klingler v. 
Dir., Dep’t of Revenue, 281 F.3d 776, 777 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding similarly); Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 
F.3d 391, 394-96 (6th Cir. 2002)(Title II exceeds Congressional authority under Equal Protection); Thompson 
v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S. Ct. 1960 (2002) (holding similarly); 
see also Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 812-16 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(holding abrogation invalid as to equal protection, although not as to due process claims); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. 
Health Sci. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Title II exceeds Congress’ authority under § 5 
to the extent that it authorizes suits against states when there is no evidence of “discriminatory animus or ill 
will due to disability”); as well as pre-Garrett cases: Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding abrogation invalid); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005-10 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(holding similarly); cf.,  Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir.1999) (holding 
that a regulation enacted pursuant to Title II did not validly abrogate State sovereign immunity). But see 
Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F. 3d 1167, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (reaffirming two prior circuit decisions: 
Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 1999) and Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 
1997)). In Hanson the Court concluded that Title II validly abrogated the sovereign immunity, despite a vig-
orous dissent by Judge O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Kozinski, T.G. Nelson and Kleinfeld, asserting that 
after Garrett, “Clark and Dare have gone the way of the dodo bird and the wooly mammoth, overtaken and 
relegated to extinction by the course of events.” 294 F.3d at 1166-71. 
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B. The Supreme Court Addresses the Issue in Tennessee v. Lane and United 
States v. Georgia 
In Tennessee v. Lane, it was finally time for the Supreme Court to address the 
issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of Title II.53 The Court had 
no trouble addressing the threshold question of whether Congress unequivocally 
expressed its intent to abrogate because “the ADA specifically provides for abroga-
tion.”54 Turning next to Flores’s congruence and proportionality test, the Court un-
dertook to determine the constitutional rights Congress sought to enforce when it 
enacted Title II. 
The Lane Court identified a substantial history of “pervasive unequal treatment 
[against the disabled] in the administration of state services and programs, including 
systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”55 This history included discrimina-
tory state laws, many of which were still valid law at the time of the litigation, that 
prevented the disabled from taking part in fundamentally protected activities such 
as voting, marrying, and serving as jurors. The history of discrimination was also 
documented in a number of cases that had come before the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts dealing with the unconstitutional treatment of the disabled.56 
In addition, before Congress enacted Title II, there had been several pieces of 
federal and state legislation aimed at addressing discrimination against the disabled. 
However, “important shortcomings” in the laws “rendered them ‘inadequate to ad-
dress the pervasive problems of discrimination’” faced by the disabled.57 
Having identified the general history of discrimination, the Court went on to 
discuss the evidence specifically related to the accessibility of state-owned build-
ings to those with disabilities, which the Court determined to be substantial.58 
Based on this evidence, the Court concluded the “extensive record of disability dis-
crimination” was sufficient to “[make] clear beyond peradventure that inadequate 
provisions of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate sub-
ject of prophylactic legislation.”59 The next hurdle the Court faced was whether Ti-
tle II, the legislation Congress actually did enact, was an appropriate response to the 
“history and pattern of unequal treatment” described above.60 
                                                            
 53.  541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). 
 54.  Id. at 518. 
 55.  Id. at 524. 
 56.  See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (dealing with the disabled being unjustifiably commit-
ted to psychiatric institutions); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (dealing with abuse and neglect of 
those committed to psychiatric institutions); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(dealing with irrational discrimination against the disabled in city zoning decisions). 
 57.  Lane, 541 U.S at 527. 
 58.  Id. The Court examined several of the documents Congress cited in the legislative history of Title II, 
including a 1983 report from the US Commission on Civil Rights which found that 76 percent of public ser-
vices and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disa-
bilities. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities, 39 (1983); Over-
sight Hearing on H.R. 4498 before the H. Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41, 48 (1988); and the findings of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment 
of Americans with Disabilities in 1990, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disa-
bilities, From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990). 
 59.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. 
 60.  Id. at 530. 
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Because the language of Title II is broad, its prophylactic remedies reach “a 
wide array of official conduct.”61 Everything from the administration of voting 
booths to disabled-access “seating at state-owned hockey rinks”62 is potentially a 
subject of Title II litigation. In order to avoid the issue of Title II’s insufficient tai-
loring, the Court limited the scope of its inquiry to the question with which it was 
presented: “whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional 
right of access to the courts,” leaving open the constitutionality of Title II’s many 
other applications.63 
The final step of the Court’s analysis was to determine whether the remedies 
provided by Title II were “congruent and proportional” to the right at issue in that 
case: access to the courts.64 Although the specific right at issue in the case was 
physical access to a public facility, which, in and of itself, is neither a constitutional 
nor even a recognized fundamental right, the Court noted that there were a panoply 
of related fundamental rights associated with court proceedings: 
(1) the right of the criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of 
the trial; (2) the right of litigants to have a ‘meaningful opportunity to be 
heard’ in judicial proceedings; (3) the right of the criminal defendant to 
trial by a jury composed a fair cross section of the community; and (4) 
the public right of access to criminal proceedings.65 
Title II requires states to “take reasonable measures to remove architectural 
and other barriers to accessibility.”66 These remedies are limited in that they only 
require “‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of 
the service provided” and do not require states “to undertake measures that would 
impose an undue financial or administrative burden.”67 After weighing these reme-
dies against the history of discrimination described above, the Court concluded: 
“Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of ac-
cess to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 authority to enforce 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”68 
The Supreme Court once again addressed the interplay between Title II of the 
ADA and the Eleventh Amendment in the strange case of United States v. Geor-
gia.69 That case involved a claim by a wheelchair-bound prisoner who claimed the 
state abused him in various ways related to his disability, including locking him in 
his cell for 23-24 hours a day, where he could not turn around or reach the toilet, so 
he would be “forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused 
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to assist him in cleaning up the waste.”70 The plaintiff’s pro se complaint included 
claims against both state defendants and individual prison officials for violation of 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment (and possibly 
other established constitutional rights), as well as claims for money damages 
against the state defendants under Title II of the ADA, based on the same conduct.71 
An over-eager Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Title II claims while allowing 
the plaintiff to proceed on his § 1983 claims.72 A nonplussed Justice Scalia wrote 
an opinion for a unanimous Court ordering reinstatement of the prisoner’s Title II 
claims, insofar as he alleged actual constitutional violations, noting that: “While the 
Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s ‘prophy-
lactic’ enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, no one doubts 
that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amend-
ment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those 
provisions.”73 The Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine: 
[O]n a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged 
conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct 
violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, wheth-
er Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that 
class of conduct is nevertheless valid.74 
What is noteworthy about Georgia is not the majority’s holding, but Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence, in which Justice Ginsburg joined, emphasizing that “alt-
hough petitioner Goodman’s Eighth Amendment claims provide a sufficient basis 
for reversal, our opinion does not suggest that this is the only constitutional right 
applicable in the prison context and therefore relevant to the abrogation issue.”75 
Justice Stevens noted that “Congress’s decision to extend Title II’s protec-
tions to prison inmates was not limited to violations of the Eighth Amendment,” in 
support of which he cited the “backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” leading to 
the enactment of Title II discussed in Lane.76 Additionally, he referenced the Ap-
pendixes to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Garrett “showing, for example, that prison-
ers with developmental disabilities were subject to longer terms of imprisonment 
than other prisoners,” as well as a number of other examples where individuals with 
disabilities had suffered discrimination while incarcerated.77 These included “the 
abridgment of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with access to the 
judicial process, and procedural due process violations.”78 
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C. The Lower Courts Struggle to Analyze the Applicability of Title II to 
Discrimination in Education 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, any decision that held Ti-
tle II unconstitutional across the board was no longer fully viable. However, be-
cause Lane calls for an issue-specific analysis,79 courts have not abandoned their 
prior holdings altogether. With respect to discrimination in the context of education, 
the result is somewhat of a mixed bag. 
For example, Doe v. Trustees of the University of Illinois is a post-Lane district 
court opinion out of the Seventh Circuit.80 In a pre-Lane decision, Walker v. 
Snyder, the Seventh Circuit rejected a prisoner’s claim for disability accommoda-
tions on the ground that Congress lacked the authority to subject states to Title II of 
the ADA.81  Faced with deciding whether Title II was a valid abrogation of state 
immunity in the context of education, the Doe court acknowledged the continued 
viability of Walker was questionable, but noted that “the decision provides an indi-
cation of the Seventh Circuit’s skepticism regarding the scope of Title II.”82 
The district court decided to play it safe by narrowly—and incorrectly—
interpreting Lane as having “hinged on the fact that the plaintiffs had suffered vio-
lations of a fundamental right.”83 The “difference in this case,” the district court 
noted, “is that education, despite its undoubted importance, is not considered by the 
Supreme Court to be a fundamental constitutional right . . . .”84 In the court’s view, 
this distinction was critical: without a fundamental right at issue, “Title II . . . ex-
ceeds Congress’s power under section five.”85   
The Fourth Circuit, in Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason 
Univ.,86 reached the opposite conclusion, upholding Title II as applied to educa-
tion.87 In Constantine, a law student sued a state university for disability discrimi-
nation under Title II.  The student had an established history of intractable migraine 
syndrome and was denied extra time on an exam when she suffered a migraine at-
tack during the test.  As a result, she failed the class.  She appealed her grade and 
requested a re-examination, but those requests fell on deaf ears.  As a result of her 
failing grade, Constantine was unable to graduate on time.  This delay cost her a 
clerkship she had previously accepted, and the “F” on her transcript continued to 
harm her employment prospects for years.88 
The Constantine court first acknowledged that “[b]ecause classifications based 
on disability are subject to minimal scrutiny, States may make distinctions on the 
basis of disability so long as ‘there is a rational relationship between the disparity of 
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’”89  The Constantine court 
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also acknowledged “education is not a fundamental right,”90 and because “classifi-
cations based on disability are subject to minimal scrutiny,”91 the court concluded it 
was required to apply “rational-basis review.”92  Essentially, exclusion from school 
becomes the constitutional equivalent of exclusion from a state-operated hockey 
rink. 
Once the court reached this conclusion, it should have been next-to-impossible 
to find that Congress properly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity because 
when the right protected is only subject to rational-basis review, the congruence and 
proportionality test can almost never be satisfied.93  Rational-basis sets a very low 
bar, and the number of times the Supreme Court has concluded a state did not meet 
that standard can be counted on one hand.94  Furthermore, in each of those cases the 
Court was considering the constitutionality of a single state statute.  As the Court 
made clear in Garrett, if Congress wants to justify prophylactic legislation under 
these circumstances, it would have to show “a history and pattern of unconstitution-
al discrimination by the States”—and the Supreme Court in Garrett waxed almost 
rhapsodically about how “hardheaded[]” and sensible it was for the state to discrim-
inate on the basis of disability, even if only on the basis of cost.95 
One would think, therefore, that this would be the end of the analysis, but the 
Constantine court pushed on in an effort to rationalize why a prophylactic rule 
against disability discrimination in education is more acceptable than it is in the 
employment context.  First the court cited the Supreme Court’s observation in Wa-
ters v. Churchill that “a State’s ‘interest in achieving its goals as effectively and ef-
ficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as 
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.’”96 
Having minimized the states’ interests, the court similarly minimized the bur-
den imposed by Title II (which does not necessarily require structural modifications 
to existing facilities), as opposed to Title I (which does).97  Next, the court fell back 
on “the pattern of unconstitutional disability discrimination described by the Court 
in Lane” in the provision of public services in general, concluding that even if Title 
II “exceeds the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment,” it is not so out of pro-
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portion “that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, un-
constitutional behavior.”98 
The Constantine court’s reasoning was a clear misapplication of Lane.  The 
test in Lane is explicitly designed to determine whether Title II is constitutional on 
an “as applied” basis.99  Therefore, it is necessary to establish unconstitutional dis-
crimination within the “class of cases” at issue.100  Rather than follow the lead of 
Lane and examine how discrimination in education services can impair fundamen-
tal rights, the Constantine court simply cited Lane for the general proposition that 
“Title II was enacted in response to a pattern of unconstitutional disability discrimi-
nation by States . . . with respect to the provisions of public services.” 101  Nor did 
the court make any effort to identify instances of irrational discrimination in the 
context of education, even though Lane itself references a number of such cases. 
The Constantine court’s effort to downplay the remedies provided in Title II 
are also not particularly convincing.  By any measure, the remedies provided by Ti-
tle II are actually quite substantial, including the creation of a private right of action 
for money damages against state governments in abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, the jurisprudence regarding prophylactic legislation requires that 
Congress abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity only in order to safe-
guard a constitutional guarantee.102 While it is one thing to allow prophylactic leg-
islation to exceed the strict boundaries of the unconstitutional conduct it was enact-
ed to address, it is quite another to approve prophylactic legislation in the absence 
of any unconstitutional violations, so long as it is not too burdensome, as the court 
in Constantine effectively holds. 
These missteps on the part of the Fourth Circuit stem from the same basic er-
ror:  once the court identifies the standard of review as rational basis, prophylactic 
legislation becomes almost impossible to justify.  Because Lane prescribed an “as 
applied” analysis to Title II, it makes no difference if, on the whole, Title II is not 
“so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”103  
Rather, there must be a showing of proportionality in the “class of cases” at is-
sue.104 
Because Constantine failed to conduct an “as applied” analysis, its logic sug-
gests  all of Title II properly abrogated the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
which was the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit pre-Garrett, and which it has 
maintained post-Lane.105 Although there is a spate of cases in the Northern District 
of California that have held Title II did not abrogate state immunity in the context 
of education, curiously none of them acknowledge, much less attempt to distin-
guish, there is controlling Ninth Circuit authority to the contrary.106 
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Some lower courts in the Fourth Circuit, as in the Ninth, have stumbled over 
this approach, but rather than follow the example of the Northern District of Cali-
fornia and simply ignore the circuit’s holding, they have found creative ways to 
read Constantine more narrowly.  For example, the district court in Belk v. Smith107 
addressed a prisoner’s Title II claim that his disability prevented him from partici-
pating in a program that allowed prisoners to earn credit towards a reduced sen-
tence. 
The district court did not believe Congress had authority to abrogate the State’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the prison context.  It therefore concluded that 
Constantine’s apparent holding that Title II had abrogated the state’s immunity in 
all its endeavors was too broad:  “[O]n its face, the [Constantine] Court’s reasoning 
appears applicable to all situations in which a state, acting as a sovereign, engages 
in conduct which could implicate an individual’s right to be free from irrational dis-
ability discrimination.”108 
Nevertheless, the Belk court distinguished Constantine by pointing to the “spe-
cial role” of education that “has at times resulted in courts exercising greater scruti-
ny.”109 A clever move, but nothing in the Constantine opinion even hints it is ap-
plying a higher level of scrutiny because education is involved. Indeed, the 
Constantine court doesn’t waste so much as a line extolling the importance of edu-
cation.110 
In Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n111 the Third Circuit concluded 
that Title II is a “justifiable prophylactic measure to avoid the risk of unconstitu-
tional treatment of disabled students,” based on a “regrettable past history” of “ex-
clusion and segregation of disabled students.”112  The Bowers court relied largely 
on Constantine113 for its holding that Congress validly abrogated Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the public education context.114 
The Second Circuit also addressed the applicability of Title II to the education-
al context in the pre-Lane case, Garcia v. S.U.N.Y Health Sciences Center of Brook-
lyn.115  Garcia was a medical student who was dismissed for failure to pass all the 
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first-year courses.116  He brought suit under Title II, inter alia, claiming that he was 
denied an accommodation for his Attention Deficit Disorder.117  Applying a 
straightforward pre-Lane analysis, the court concluded that “Title II in its entirety 
exceeds Congress’s authority under § 5 . . . .”118  Once again, this is contrary to the 
holding in Lane. 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress did act within its 
constitutional authority in providing a damages remedy, insofar as “plaintiffs bring-
ing such suits to establish that the Title II violation was motivated by discriminatory 
animus or ill will based on the plaintiff’s disability.”119  Finding that Garcia did not 
“allege discriminatory animus or ill will based on his purported disability,”120 the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Title II claim.  In other 
words, the Second Circuit held that Title II is valid insofar as it provides a remedy 
for specific acts of discrimination that are motivated by ill will or irrational discrim-
ination on the basis of disability.  The problem, of course, is that Title II is, ines-
capably, a prophylactic rule. In 2015, the Second Circuit noted in Dean v. Univ. at 
Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis.,121 that subsequent to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Georgia,122  there was “continued uncertainty” as to the 
vitality of its holding in Garcia.123 The Dean court questioned whether Title II is an 
invalid exercise of congressional authority insofar as it purported to create a 
prophylactic rule, which “has led to a divergence in the approaches adopted by dis-
trict courts in this Circuit in their assessment of Congress’s abrogation of sovereign 
immunity under Title II.”124  Ultimately the Second Circuit punted on the issue: 
“We express no position as to the question of whether Congress has validly abro-
gated sovereign immunity in the context of discrimination in access to public edu-
cation on the basis of disability.”125 
VI. A BETTER APPROACH: THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN EDUCATION AND 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MAKES EDUCATION A “VITAL RIGHT” 
WARRANTING A HIGHER LEVEL OF SCRUTINY THAN RATIONAL BASIS 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly stated there is no constitu-
tional right to education126 and the disabled are not a suspect class.127 Nevertheless, 
a closer look at Lane in conjunction with other Supreme Court precedents, suggests 
that this does not compel the conclusion that Congress exceeded its authority when 
it enacted Title II. 
A. Reexamining Lane: A More Expansive Application of the Congruence and 
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Proportionality Test 
One of the striking aspects of Lane is that the majority opinion was authored 
by Justice Stevens128 and joined by Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Brey-
er, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia dis-
sented.  In short, with the defection of Justice O’Connor, the dissenters in Garrett 
became the majority in Lane, while the majority in Garrett became the dissenters in 
Lane. 
Another striking aspect is that rather than consider the validity of Title II as 
“an undifferentiated whole,” the Court chose to evaluate the statute in the context of 
the specific circumstances in the case before it: “the constitutional right of access to 
the courts.”129 In this manner, the Court was able to avoid the argument that Title II 
“is not appropriately tailored to serve its objectives,” because it “applies not only to 
public education and voting-booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey 
rinks.”130 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Lane is that although the specific right at 
issue in the case was physical access to a public facility, the Court acknowledged 
there are a panoply of related rights that might be impacted as well. Thus, the Lane 
majority lists a bundle of fundamental rights associated with court proceedings: 
(1) the right of the criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of 
the trial; (2) the right of litigants to have a ‘meaningful opportunity to be 
heard’ in judicial proceedings; (3) the right of the criminal defendant to 
trial by a jury composed a fair cross section of the community; and (4) 
the public right of access to criminal proceedings.131 
With respect to evidence of discrimination, Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, 
was correct in pointing out the majority was able to identify few, if any, instances 
where Congress documented an actual denial of due process because of physical 
inaccessibility:132 
A violation of due process occurs only when a person is actually denied 
the constitutional right to access a given judicial proceeding. We have 
never held that a person has a constitutional right to make his way into a 
courtroom without any external assistance.  Indeed, the fact that the State 
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may need to assist an individual to attend a hearing has no bearing on 
whether the individual successfully exercises his due process right to be 
present at the proceeding.133 
And, as the dissent tartly observes, the actual plaintiff in Lane was not pre-
vented from attending court: 
The majority admits that Lane was able to attend the initial hearing of his 
criminal trial. Ante, at 514. Lane was arrested for failing to appear at his 
second hearing only after he refused assistance from officers dispatched 
by the court to help him to the courtroom. Ibid.  The court conducted a 
preliminary hearing in the first-floor library to accommodate Lane’s dis-
ability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 16, and later offered to move all further 
proceedings in the case to a handicapped-accessible courthouse in a 
nearby town.  In light of these facts, it can hardly be said that the State 
violated Lane’s right to be present at his trial; indeed, it made affirmative 
attempts to secure that right.134 
The majority countered by observing “Congress enacted Title II against a 
backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and 
programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”135 The Court 
observed its own decisions, as well as those of other courts, “document a pattern of 
unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, pro-
grams, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting. No-
tably, these decisions also demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the 
administration of justice.”136 
A concurrence by Justice Souter in which Justice Ginsburg joined, “piled on” 
as it were, by pointing out “the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of 
the very discrimination subject to congressional remedy under § 5,” citing, for ex-
ample Buck v. Bell,137 which “was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality 
of the once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with mental disabili-
ties.”138  The fact that little of this evidence dealt with the specific issue at hand, 
lack of physical access to court buildings was of no particular moment to the major-
ity. Thus, despite the dissent’s pointed criticisms, the majority concluded Title II of 
the ADA was a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context 
of that case. 
I suggest the Lane majority was actually applying something akin to a cost-
benefit analysis to the situation.  Basic economics teaches that the more expensive 
or difficult something is to obtain, the less it will be consumed. Requiring a disa-
bled person crawl up the courthouse steps, or even to be carried into court by court 
personnel, imposes a significant additional burden and, at least, a sacrifice of per-
sonal dignity, in order for that person to exercise his fundamental right of access to 
justice.  Even if this does not make access altogether impossible, it is a significant 
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burden that others need not endure when availing themselves of their right to due 
process through the courts. 
Importantly, not only is there a loss of personal dignity, the burden of accom-
modating the needs of those with disabilities on an ad hoc basis may subtly skew 
the legal process against the disabled litigant.  After all, requiring court personnel to 
carry disabled adults, or forcing the court to re-schedule or relocate hearings so the 
disabled person can make an appearance, imposes significant burdens on the institu-
tion, burdens that will be directly attributed to the troublesome litigant, who may 
fear (wrongly or rightly) this will cause resentment on the part of individuals on 
whom these burdens fall. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the need to employ ex-
traordinary measures to gain access to court facilities will deny the disabled litigant 
full equality before the law by forcing him to make repeated, troublesome demands 
on the court and its staff. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that the most important legal battles 
can often be quite protracted, requiring many visits to the courthouse.  In aggregate, 
this higher cost is going to put pressure on individuals with disabilities to avoid tak-
ing such actions or forcing them into unfavorable settlements—in effect chilling 
their access to justice.  Even if not entirely deterred, being relegated to such ex-
traordinary measures to achieve what people without disabilities have by just walk-
ing into the courthouse may impart a reasonable apprehension about being short-
changed in the administration of justice.  In other words, they will feel unequal be-
fore the law. 
Viewed from this perspective, the majority’s analysis makes sense.  If the 
harm involved is not an actual, categorical denial of due process but, rather, a con-
tinuous burdening of due process rights by the need to invoke extraordinary means 
to achieve access, then it is not necessary to show a rich history of actual denial of 
due process.  It is enough that there is a significant documented history of court-
houses that are physically inaccessible to the disabled unless take advantage of de-
meaning and possibly prejudicial procedures. Coupled with the strong logical infer-
ence that such barriers will burden and probably deter the exercise of due process 
rights, this suffices to document a pattern of abridgement of constitutional rights. 
Although unarticulated by the Lane majority, similar such logic must have 
motivated the Court to ratchet back the rigorous application of the “congruent and 
proportional” test it had deployed strictly in prior cases.  This inferential chain ena-
bled the Court to protect something understood to be precious, even without docu-
mented examples that its abridgment resulting constitutional violations. 
Indeed, by the nature of the rights involved, it would have been very difficult 
for Congress to provide actual examples of how the additional burdens on those 
with disabilities would abridge their due process rights.  If a person with a disability 
wanted to avoid the indignity and uncertainty of having to be carried into court for 
every appearance and therefore chooses not to bring a lawsuit, or enter into a plea 
agreement rather than go to trial in a criminal case, how would we ever find out? 
What we must infer from Lane is that the congruence and proportionality test 
may be satisfied based on common sense inferences from the available evidence, 
without a documented record of actual occurrences.  As happened in Morgan, the 
dissent’s criticism actually serves to broaden the majority’s holding by pointing out 
the Court is willing to uphold an exercise of congressional power without a rigorous 
showing that Congress’s selected remedy responded to actual constitutional viola-
tions. 
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The majority’s approach in Lane was reprised by Justice Stevens in his con-
currence in United States v. Georgia, where he stated: 
[G]iven the constellation of rights applicable in the prison context, it is 
clear that the Eleventh Circuit has erred in identifying only the Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in per-
forming the first step of the “congruence and proportionality” inquiry set 
forth in City of Boerne v. Flores.139 
This language reflects, and reinforces, the approach taken in Lane that the 
“congruence and proportionality” analysis should not be limited to the specific right 
at issue in the case. 
This is essentially the approach the majority in Flores adopted in retrofitting Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan by tying the elimination of an English language literacy re-
quirement to the enhancement of the political power of the Puerto Rican minority, 
leading in turn to the elimination of discrimination in accessing public services by 
the Puerto Rican community. This is the essence of the “vital right” analysis: a right 
that is not itself guaranteed by the Constitution but supports constitutional rights. 
B. Education Is a Vital Right 
Just as the Court was forced to revisit Morgan in the context of the congruent 
and proportional test announced in Flores, so too it will need to grapple with its 
earlier decision in Plyler v. Doe140 when it decides whether Title II is a valid exer-
cise of congressional authority in the context of education.  The question presented 
in Plyler was whether states may deny a tuition-free public education to children of 
illegal aliens. Justice Brennan got his five votes, and he made the most of it. 
Justice Brennan began with a frank survey of the constitutional landscape: 
Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class, because their 
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a “constitutional 
irrelevancy.” Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justi-
fy by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which educa-
tion is provided to its population.141 
This should have sounded the death knell for plaintiffs’ claims in Plyler, but 
Justice Brennan was only getting warmed up. 
In an opinion as devoid of a unifying constitutional theory as it was full of 
warmth and compassion, Brennan pointed out several factors ultimately leading to 
the conclusion that the state scheme violated equal protection.  Drawing on prior 
cases, he pointed out the significance of education to success and, indeed, to the 
proper functioning of our society:  “By denying these children a basic education, we 
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and fore-
close any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to 
the progress of our Nation.”142  He also pointed out that “[W]hether education is a 
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fundamental right, Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of 
children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will 
mark them for the rest of their lives.”143  
Although Justice Brennan purported to sympathize with the State’s desire not 
to waste scarce resources educating children that will soon be deported, he pointed 
out “a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child 
will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed. It 
would, of course, be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a 
child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.”144 Moreover, Justice 
Brennan observed, in a final flourish: 
The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the 
education provided by the State within the confines of the State’s bor-
ders. In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented 
children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefi-
nitely, and that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the Unit-
ed States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to 
achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illit-
erates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of 
unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings 
might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are whol-
ly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, 
and the Nation.145 
Although Justice Brennan’s majority opinion garnered five votes, several of 
the Justices who joined him also wrote separately.  Justice Marshall reiterated the 
position he had taken in San Antonio School District that education should be 
deemed a constitutional right.146  Justice Powell noted that it is “certain that illegal 
aliens will continue to enter the United States and, as the record makes clear, an un-
known percentage of them will remain here. I agree with the Court that their chil-
dren should not be left on the streets uneducated.”147  He analogized the case to the 
Court’s earlier decision in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,148 where the 
Court held that “‘visiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant’ for the mis-
deeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and ‘contrary to the basic concept of our 
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility 
or wrongdoing.’”149 
Justice Blackmun wrote separately to reiterate his adherence to the holding in 
San Antonio School District  that education is not a fundamental right, but then 
opined “[o]nly a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions 
among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States . . . .”150  
Not wanting to be a pedant, Justice Blackmun pointed out the relevant question is 
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not whether there is a fundamental right to education vel non but rather whether the 
State can exclude certain children from the educational system once it provides ac-
cess to education for most of the children within its community: 
Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmount-
able competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the 
opportunity to achieve. And when those children are members of an iden-
tifiable group, that group – through the State’s action – will have been 
converted into a discrete underclass. . . .  In a sense, then, denial of an 
education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former rele-
gates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places him at 
a permanent political disadvantage.151  
Although firmly maintaining that education is not a constitutional right, five 
justices nevertheless concluded that the state could not deny a free public education 
to children who were in the country illegally.  The justices supported this conclu-
sion with a variety of rationales which can be categorized as falling into two related 
categories:  (1) the children should not suffer a permanent and irremediable disad-
vantage on account of misconduct by their parents; and (2) it makes little sense for 
us as a society to create a permanent underclass of uneducated adults who will not 
be able to fully participate in the economic and civic life of the community where 
they will likely spend their lives. 
Significantly, in his concurrence, Justice Brennan noted “[w]e have recog-
nized ‘the public school as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a 
democratic system of government . . . .’”152  I find “vital” a useful term because it 
denotes a particular kind of relationship between the activity in question and life in 
the modern world.  When modifying the term “rights,” it denotes those rights that 
are not constitutionally guaranteed but nevertheless play a key role in allowing us 
as individuals and collectively as a society to take advantage of constitutional rights 
and discharge civic responsibilities we have come to embrace as universal. 
Education clearly fits within the category of “vital” for the reasons explained 
by Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education,153 and by the various oth-
er courts that have addressed the issue.  Even though the Supreme Court has refused 
to find a constitutional right to education, it has certainly recognized the pivotal 
function education plays in our society.  For example, in Smith v. Robinson154 the 
Court referred to the Education of the Handicapped Act, a predecessor of the IDEA, 
as “a comprehensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the States in complying with 
their constitutional obligations to provide public education for handicapped chil-
dren.”155  One marvels at the mystery of constitutional obligations without corre-
sponding constitutional rights, but (as Justice Brennan was fond of saying) when 
you have five Supreme Court votes, you can do anything.156 
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C. Applying the Congruence and Proportionality Test as Refined by Lane: 
Title II Validly Abrogated State Immunity in the Area of Education 
Shortly after Lane was decided, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in As-
sociation for Disabled Americans v. Florida International.157 That case involved 
claims against a state university for violating Title II of the ADA by “inter alia, 
failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters, failing to provide adequate 
auxiliary aids and services such as effective note takers, and failing to furnish ap-
propriate aids to its students with disabilities such as physical access to certain pro-
grams and facilities at FIU.”158  The university moved to dismiss on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds.  Applying the Flores congruence and proportionality test 
consistent with the Court’s application in Lane, the Eleventh Circuit held that Con-
gress had validly abrogated state immunity under Title II in the context of educa-
tion. 
The Eleventh Circuit started by noting: 
Although classifications relating to education only involve rational basis 
review under the Equal Protection Clause, ‘[b]oth the importance of edu-
cation in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its 
deprivation on the life of the child,’ distinguishes public education from 
other rights subject to rational basis review. The Supreme Court long has 
recognized that even when discrimination in education does not abridge a 
fundamental right, the gravity of the harm is vast and far reaching.159 
Thus, “the constitutional right to equality in education, though not fundamental, is 
vital to the future success of our society.” 160  For those reasons, the court conclud-
ed “[d]iscrimination against disabled students in education affects disabled persons’ 
future ability to exercise and participate in the most basic rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship, such as voting and participation in public programs and services,” 
and it is therefore appropriate to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to discrimina-
tion cases dealing with education.161 
The vital role of education, not only with respect to the individual but also 
to society as a whole, is not merely a matter of common sense.  Studies show the 
level of an individual’s education is one of the most reliable predictors of many 
conventional measures of success.  For example, educational level is highly corre-
lated to an individual’s ability to earn a living.162 The average unemployment rate 
for those with a college degree is 3.5 percent, for those with a high school diploma 
the rate is 6 percent, and for individuals without a high school diploma the average 
unemployment rate is a whopping 9 percent.163 
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Education is an important predictor for long term health, with the more ed-
ucated reporting fewer instances of hypertension, diabetes, depression, and many 
other diseases.164 A healthier population means less of a burden on our already 
strained health-care system coupled with a greater ability to pay for medical ser-
vices when required. 
Even if these were the only impacts of education, it would certainly justify 
congressional attention. But education has a direct impact on the exercise of an in-
dividual’s more fundamental rights, such as the right to vote. In the 2008 presiden-
tial election, the voter turnout level for individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree 
was 71.8 percent.  For high school graduates, it was 50.9 percent. For those with 
less than a ninth grade education, the number dropped to 23.4 percent.165 
Education also plays a key role in the ability of individuals to communicate 
effectively both orally and in writing.166 For those who lack the ability to com-
municate, the First Amendment right to free speech is of little practical value. 
In the words of Chief Justice Warren, writing in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and lo-
cal governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity 
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right, which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.167 
Furthermore, the inability to exercise these rights affects not only the student but 
also society as a whole. 
D. There is Abundant Evidence of Discrimination against the Disabled in the 
Area of Public Education 
Having established education is a vital right, the next issue is the evidence of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the area of education. There is 
ample evidence indicating individuals with disabilities are disproportionally repre-
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sented among those Americans suffering from a poor education. Twenty-one per-
cent of the adult population of the United States cannot read above a 5th grade lev-
el.168 Fourteen percent, of the population, or 32 million adults are illiterate.169 Of 
these 32 million, 21 percent are individuals with disabilities, even though they con-
stitute only 9 percent of the general population.170 There is no question that dis-
crimination against those with disabilities in accessing education has contributed to 
this disparity. 
Prior to the enactment of the EAHC in 1975, “congressional studies revealed 
that better than half of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not receiving 
appropriate educational services. Indeed, one out of every eight of these children 
was excluded from the public school system altogether; many others were simply 
‘warehoused’ in special classes or were neglectfully shepherded through the system 
until they were old enough to drop out.”171  As the court in Ass’n for Disabled 
Americans noted, Lane “documented a pattern of unequal treatment in the admin-
istration of a wide range of public services . . . including . . . public educa-
tion . . . .”172 
The court continued, “Furthermore, Title II requires only ‘reasonable modifica-
tions that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided.’”173 
“For example, in its attempt to equalize physical access to public buildings, Con-
gress imposed reasonable architectural standards for new construction and allowed 
for less costly measures for older facilities.”174  The court concluded that “[i]n light 
of the long history of state discrimination against students with disabilities . . . [t]he 
relief available under Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the injury 
and means adopted to remedy the injury.”175  Significantly, this was the position 
suggested by the United States in its brief as intervenor.176 
The First Circuit adopted much the same approach just a year later in Toledo v. 
Sanchez.177  While employing a somewhat expanded explication of the Lane analy-
sis, which seemed to track closely to the government’s position,178 the First Circuit 
found that 
(T)he thirty years preceding the enactment of the ADA evidence, a wide-
spread pattern of states unconstitutionally excluding disabled children 
from public education and irrationally discriminating against disabled 
                                                            
 168.  National Center for Education Statistics, Average prose, document and quantative literacy scores of 
adults: 1992 and 2003, https://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_demographics.asp. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988) (citations omitted). 
 172.  Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ten-
nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525 (2004)). 
 173.  Id. at 959 (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004)). 
 174.  Id. (footnote omitted); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.1551; § 35.150(b)(1). 
 175.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004). 
 176.  Corrected Supplemental Brief for the United States as Intervenor, Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. 
Int’l Univ., No. 02-10360-JJ (11th Cir. 2004) 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/14/assocdisabled_supp.pdf (hereinafter “Associa-
tion of Disabled Americans U.S. Brief”). 
 177.  454 F. 3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 178.  See, e.g., id. (explicitly adopting the government’s position as to the level of generality at which to 
conduct the “congruence and proportionality” analysis). 
58 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:1] 
students within schools. Faced with this record of persistent unconstitu-
tional state action, coupled with the inability of earlier federal legislation 
to solve this “difficult and intractable problem,” Congress was justified in 
enacting prophylactic § 5 legislation in response.179 
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the First Circuit in Toledo found it significant that “Title 
II’s implementing regulations and the case law interpreting the Act demonstrate that 
the obligations imposed by Title II are limited in several ways that minimize the 
compliance costs imposed on states.”180 And it quoted the Eleventh Circuit for the 
key proposition that denial of education “affects disabled persons’ future ability to 
exercise and participate in the most basic rights and responsibilities of citizen-
ship . . . “181  
Finally, relying on both on Association for Disabled Americans and Con-
stantine, the First Circuit concluded the obligation created by Title II of the ADA 
“is not disproportionate to the need to protect against the outright exclusion and ir-
rational disability discrimination that such students experienced in the recent 
past.”182  This conclusion is not only correct, but also fits well within the frame-
work of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
E. Vital Rights and Vital Institutions 
Vital rights are rights not themselves guaranteed by the Constitution, but are so 
important to the exercise of fundamental rights that abridging them would “often 
have the same practical effect as outright exclusion,” i.e. denying a fundamental 
right altogether.183  Similarly, vital institutions are so closely tied to the exercise of 
fundamental rights that we can presume, as a matter of experience and common 
sense, that impairing access to those institutions will, of necessity, diminish the 
ability to exercise fundamental rights, even if it is not possible to document specific 
instances where this has happened.  Given our knowledge of how society works, 
our understanding of human psychology, and a proper respect for the dignity and 
individuality of our fellow citizens, we can be reasonably confident that interfer-
ence with the ability to make use of the vital institution will necessarily impair con-
stitutionally protected rights. 
Schools and courts are examples of what I would consider to be vital institu-
tions, and they have many things in common.  They are generally run by the state 
(although we also have institutions that dispense private justice and private educa-
tion). Both are universally available to those who need them, either free of charge 
or for a modest fee that is waivable to those who cannot afford it.  In both types of 
institutions, there are great numbers who are compelled to attend, and severe penal-
ties attach to failure to do so without proper authorization.  Most importantly, both 
institutions are vital to the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, as well 
as other rights and benefits that we consider vital to partaking of the full range of 
benefits society has to offer. 
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Once an institution is identified as vital, rather than applying rational basis, any 
impairment by a state of the ability to use that institution would be reviewed under 
a heightened standard of scrutiny.  The court could then proceed to perform a “con-
gruence and proportionality” analysis, treating either impairment of access to a vital 
institution or impairment of a vital right as proxies for constitutional violations. 
The primary advantage of this approach is that it would enable Congress to 
adopt prophylactic legislation with respect to those governmental activities central 
to the exercise of fundamental rights differently from other activities—such as as-
signing “seating at state-owned hockey rinks”184—that have little bearing on consti-
tutional rights.  While the courts would be the ultimate arbiters as to what consti-
tutes a vital institution or a vital right, Congress may well express its view in 
passing the legislation, and the courts would be justified in taking congressional 
views into account in making that decision.185 
There will no doubt continue to be disagreement among judges and justices as 
to whether rights and institutions should be considered “vital.” However, the dis-
pute will turn on such substantive question as the centrality of the governmental ac-
tivity in question to our national ethos and its relationship to the exercise of funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, rather than arcane disputes about 
whether or not Congress managed to identify a sufficient number of constitutional 
violations demonstrating a “history and pattern” of constitutional violations by the 
states.186 
F. Vital Rights v. Fundamental Rights 
A reasonable objection to the idea of vital rights is “if these rights are so im-
portant, why not just recognize them as fundamental?”  There are a few good rea-
sons for this.  To begin with, a fundamental right must be found in the Constitution.  
There have been several unenumerated fundamental rights identified by the Su-
preme Court, but the process of doing so is often clumsy and burdensome—
requiring an unsatisfying patchwork of justifications.187 
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Furthermore, recognizing a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution 
potentially invites a host of responsibilities.  If, for instance, the Supreme Court 
were to recognize education as a fundamental right, it would take on the thankless 
task of determining exactly what is encompassed in that right and who must pay for 
it.  Courts that have waded into that quagmire have had cause to regret it.188 
The Supreme Court, in fact, confronted this very question in the 1973 case of 
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District189 and only two Justices—
Marshall and Douglas—were willing to hold that education is a fundamental right.  
The question in San Antonio School District was whether Texas violated the Con-
stitution by funding school districts in large part based on the local property tax, 
which resulted in strikingly unequal resources for schools throughout the State, de-
pending on the local tax base.  This meant schools in richer neighborhoods were 
much more well-funded than those in poorer ones. Therefore, children living in 
wealthy neighborhoods received a far better education than children living in poor 
ones. 
Two years earlier, the California Supreme Court had held in Serra-
no v. Priest190 that education is a fundamental right and the state violated equal 
protection by providing school funding based in large part on the local property tax 
base, which varied greatly depending on the wealth of the community.  While the 
analysis in Serrano was based almost entirely on the federal Constitution, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court effectively cert-proofed its opinion by holding that the same 
result would be obtained under the state constitution.191 
When the U.S. Supreme Court made its ruling in San Antonio, it was well 
aware of Serrano, and indeed added a “cautionary postscript” to its opinion, effec-
tively disapproving what it viewed as the unwise incursion of the California Su-
preme Court into functions reserved to the political branches of government:  “The 
consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation 
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various 
States . . . .”192  Noting that it “lack[ed] both the expertise and the familiarity with 
local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the rais-
ing and disposition of public revenues,”193 the Court was unwilling to take on the 
task of defining and enforcing a constitutionally required level of education.194 
As noted, only two justices disagreed, although two other justices would have 
ruled for petitioner on other grounds.195  Justice Marshall’s magisterial dissent, 
which takes up over 60 pages in the U.S. Reports, went unheeded.196  The Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In both cases, the Court dug deep into the ether of con-
stitutional interpretation in order to settle highly contentious social issues.  The Court is unlikely to take such 
a leap when it comes to education. 
 188.  See generally William A. Fischell, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT’L TAX. J. 465 
(1989) (author answers question in the affirmative). 
 189.  411 U.S. 1, 137 (1973). 
 190.  487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). 
 191.  See id. at 1250 n.11 (“Consequently, our analysis of plaintiffs’ federal equal protection contention is 
also applicable to their claim under these state constitutional provisions.”). 
 192.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58. 
 193.  Id. at 41. 
 194.  Id. at 73. 
 195.  See id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (White, J., dissenting). 
 196.  See id. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
  61 
has never deviated from this position, noting perhaps the sad fate of the California 
school system as Serrano v. Priest was implemented.197 
The concept of vital rights sidesteps these problems.  The only effect that 
recognition of such a right would confer would be heightening the standard of scru-
tiny a court applies when evaluating prophylactic legislation concerning that right—
essentially codifying the Court’s analysis in Lane.  Another important advantage is 
that fundamental rights, once announced by the Supreme Court, are difficult or im-
possible to roll back.  While from time to time the Court has reversed course after it 
had first refused to recognize a fundamental right,198 it is difficult to come up ex-
amples where the Court has repudiated a right once it recognized the right as fun-
damental.  Vital rights, by contrast, are not based explicitly on the Constitution but 
rather reflect a pragmatic judgment about current societal arrangements, priorities, 
and institutions.  They can be recognized and provide a measure of predictability, 
so long as they reflect the current cultural and political reality.  When society 
changes and previously recognized vital rights no longer reflect current norms, they 
can be jettisoned or modified without undertaking the daunting task of amending or 
re-interpreting the Constitution. 
At the same time, the panoply of vital rights can be expanded, as the need aris-
es and social forms evolve.  Without undertaking the analysis, it is difficult to say 
for certain whether there are currently any vital institutions in addition to courts and 
schools, but other possibilities suggest themselves for inclusion now or in the fu-
ture: emergency health care facilities, prisons, public parks, sidewalks, and home-
less shelters.  Each has a significant connection to the exercise of fundamental 
rights and may qualify as vital institutions. 
Another valid concern is whether the concept of vital rights will have the effect 
of making constitutional law even more complex and uncertain, exacerbating the 
issues raised by the Court’s recognition of fundamental rights.199 However, in real-
ity, the Rubicon has already been crossed.  As discussed above, the Supreme Court 
has long considered education to be a vital right, and in Lane and Georgia the Court 
expanded the concept to include the courts and prison systems. Thus, there is an ad-
vantage to expressly acknowledging the concept of vital rights, and articulating its 
parameters. 
Another positive impact of acknowledging the concept of vital rights is that it 
can help restore the balance between Judicial and Congressional power, at least 
from the perspective of the Legislative branch. 
One might validly question whether it makes sense to add yet another amor-
phous layer of rights atop the already amorphous fundamental rights framework.  
However, I believe the Supreme Court is already doing this, as demonstrated most 
clearly by Tennessee v. Lane and United States v. Georgia.  The Court does not, as 
a practical matter treat all State activities with equal deference.  When it comes to 
courts and prisons (Lane and Georgia, respectively), where individual rights are di-
rectly implicated by the State’s activities, the Court is far more inclined to defer to 
congressional judgments than where the State is acting as an employer (Garrett, 
Kimel). 
                                                            
 197.  See id. n.189. 
 198.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2002) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick  
478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896)). 
 199.  See Randy Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights? 9 U. PA. J. CONST.L.1-22 (2006). 
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Nor would it be particularly difficult to identify areas of State activity that di-
rectly implicate fundamental rights.  The activity in question must be one that in-
volves government interaction with the public in a way that implicates individual 
rights.  Courts, prisons, schools, law enforcement quite clearly qualify; operating 
hockey rinks just as obviously does not.  While there may be some activities that 
are debatable—there are always close cases—these could be eliminated by a strong 
presumption that State activities do not implicate vital rights unless it is clear be-
yond reasonable debate that they do.  While this will take some effort on the part of 
the courts, once the principal categories of vital rights are established, they would 
remain relatively stable unless and until overtaken by historical events.  The gains 
in terms of stability and predictability when Congress passes prophylactic legisla-
tion are well worth the effort. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Education is one of the most fundamentally important services provided by the 
government.  It gives people a foundation on which they build their lives and future 
success.  Increased levels of education have been correlated with everything from 
greater levels of civic participation, to higher levels of income, and even to in-
creased life expectancy. 
Inequalities have long plagued the American educational system.  This is espe-
cially true when it comes to the disabled, who face greater levels of discrimination 
in all walks for life, but especially in regards to government services.  In response 
to this evil, Congress passed Title II of the ADA, which sought to guarantee the 
disabled equality in access to public services. 
The Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Lane requires lower courts to judge the 
congruence and proportionality of Title II’s application on an ‘as applied’ basis.  
Issues dealing with discrimination in education are historically afforded rational ba-
sis review.  The Supreme Court has never found the test for congruence and propor-
tionality satisfied when the right in question is to be free from irrational discrimina-
tion.  Accordingly, many courts are having a difficult time applying Title II to the 
ADA.  There is a sense that rational basis is not really appropriate—that education 
is of such vital importance that it is an injustice to treat it as if it were no different 
than allocating seats at a state-owned hockey-rink. Nevertheless, some courts feel 
bound by the lines of historical practice.  Because of the way the congruence and 
proportionality test has traditionally been administered, courts feel unable to follow 
their intuition about the importance of education, and to conclude that Congress has 
the authority to provide an effective remedy when states deny full participation in 
the educational system to the weakest among us. 
However, in a post-Lane world, that intuition need no longer be ignored.  By 
allowing prophylactic legislation even without a showing that there was any actual 
denial of a fundamental right, the Court created a release valve for cases where 
strict adherence to jurisprudence is at war with common sense. This paper proposes 
how the Lane analysis can be broadened and generalized by recognizing the twin 
concepts of vital rights and vital institutions.  Adopting this approach will codify 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lane and allow for the use of prophylactic legisla-
tion where it is hard or impossible to show actual violations of constitutional rights, 
but that which is being violated nevertheless has such a significant nexus to the ex-
ercise of fundamental rights that its protection is vital.  Education is one such vital 
right and the educational system is a vital institution.  There are doubtless others. 
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Identifying areas of State activity that directly implicate fundamental rights 
and freeing Congress of the need to create a legislative record demonstrating con-
gruence and proportionality when passing prophylactic legislation will give Con-
gress broader powers to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity where 
it believes it is necessary to do so in order to protect individual rights.  At the same 
time, it will retain the strict regime of Flores for the many other areas of State activ-
ity where individual rights are seldom directly implicated, such as operation of qua-
si-commercial activities and other non-essential functions.  Adopting this regime 
will also encourage Congress to focus its attention on specific State functions rather 
than passing blunderbuss statutes and then waiting to see which majority of Justices 
will prevail in upholding or striking down particular legislative enactments.  This, I 
believe, will strike a better balance than now prevails between the power of Con-
gress to legislate and the autonomy of the States. 
 
 
 
